2024 Election Watch Series (Part I): How might elections in Pakistan affect India-Pakistan ties?
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Summary:
2024 has been dubbed as the election year with half the world’s population heading to the polls. In a multi-part ‘2024 Election Watch’ series, I will explore how elections organized by countries across the world might impact India.
In the first part of the ‘2024 Election Watch’ series, I will focus on how upcoming elections in Pakistan might shape India-Pakistan ties.
Nawaz Sharif, former three-time Prime Minister and leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), is widely seen as the front-runner in the 2024 Pakistani general elections and is supported by the Pakistani Army.
Sharif recently made appeals for better ties with India and pushed for dialogue between the two countries during his previous tenures.
While bilateral ties between India and Pakistan have broadly deteriorated over the past decade, there have been a few initiatives in recent months that could augur well for the two neighbors.
Even in the past, peace-building initiatives have often occurred following serious bilateral crises. For instance, the 2003 ceasefire agreement that substantially reduced tensions arose after India and Pakistan almost went to war in 2001-02; a 2021 recommitment to the 2003 ceasefire agreement came about after the downgrading of diplomatic ties in 2019.
While one shouldn’t be naive about the many challenges that India and Pakistan will have to overcome to build trust, if there is political will in both nations, dialogue is possible.
Introduction:
2024 has been dubbed as the election year, with half the world’s population casting votes. The exact number of countries holding elections is unclear. The Associated Press estimates that “more than 50 countries” will organize elections, The Economist puts the figure at 76 countries. Not every country that is holding elections is a democracy – for instance, Russia is also headed to the polls this year.
Given the significant number of countries holding elections this year, I will focus on how elections in different states might impact India in a multi-part series. In this first part of the ‘2024 Election Watch’ series, I will focus on how upcoming elections in Pakistan might shape India-Pakistan ties.
Election season in South Asia:
Citizens in several countries in the South Asian subcontinent will be casting their votes this year. These include India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. People in Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Maldives already cast their votes.
In Bangladesh, Awami League, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s party, returned to power for a record fifth term in elections that were boycotted by opposition parties. In Bhutan, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) led by former Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay won the elections, returning to power having previously served from 2013 to 2018. Maldives elected opposition candidate Mohamed Muizzu to power in the 2023 presidential elections.
Given that several states in South Asia will be holding, or have already organized, elections, this is a pivotal year for Indian foreign policy. As recent events in the subcontinent demonstrate, election results can further cement India’s ties with other countries (Bangladesh is a prominent example) or can trigger crises (as is the case with Maldives).
Elections in Pakistan:
Analysts note that Nawaz Sharif, former three-time Prime Minister and leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), who recently returned from exile is the front-runner in the 2024 general elections. Imran Khan, one of the most popular politicians in the country and a former Prime Minister, is currently in prison and faces more than 180 legal cases.
A Pakistani court recently sentenced Imran Khan “to 10 years in prison just days before the country’s general election in what his party said was part of an escalating campaign to sideline the popular former prime minister.” The force behind Nawaz Sharif’s likely victory and the one responsible for Imran Khan’s political downturn is the same: the Pakistani Army.
According to Madiha Afzal, a Fellow at the Brookings Institution,
“Pakistan’s military, which sees itself as the most competent institution in the country, is now at its most powerful position since 2008, holding all decision-making reins – including that of political kingmaker – without holding overt power. It is the continuation of an approach that yields short-term stability but has ultimately led to long-term stagnation for Pakistan.”
Afzal also highlighted the intensity of the Army’s ire,
“What is different this time around is the ferocity with which the state has gone after Khan and his political party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), almost entirely hollowing it out… [the] unprecedented confrontation devolved into a zero-sum existential fight that, to little surprise, Pakistan’s military is winning.”
Afzal’s assessment (written in December 2023) is particularly striking given Imran Khan’s present predicament. On top of the 10-year sentence noted above, a Pakistani anti-graft court sentenced the former Prime Minister and his wife to 14 years each in prison. He has also been disqualified from holding any public office for 10 years. Particularly devastating for PTI, Khan’s party, is the loss of their election symbol - a cricket bat.
The Pakistani Army’s continued maneuvering to shape Pakistan’s political future is playing out alongside a serious economic crisis. Pakistan’s economy slowed in FY23, contracting by 0.6% (the GDP grew by 5.8% in FY21 and 6.1% in FY22). As per the World Bank,
“the decline in economic activity reflects the cumulation of domestic external shocks including the floods of 2022, government restrictions on imports and capital flows, domestic political uncertainty, surging world commodity prices, and tighter global financing.” [emphasis added]
Writing about the domestic political crisis in Pakistan, Ayesha Jalal argues that,
“Pakistan has been imploding in slow motion for decades, but its current predicament is beyond anything seen before… With the ruling classes and key state institutions divided and the pursuit of money and power taking precedence over principle and dedication to improving conditions for those on the margins of society and polity alike, the prospects are grim.”
In addition to compounding socio-economic problems, Pakistan is also facing security challenges. Over the past few months, the relationship between the Pakistani government and the Taliban (currently in power in Afghanistan) has soured substantially. This is primarily because of the terrorist attacks carried out by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Pakistan and the link between the TTP and the Taliban.
In November 2023, Pakistan’s caretaker Prime Minister Anwaarul Haq said that there was a “60 percent increase in terrorism and a 500 percent spike in suicide bombings since the Afghan Taliban came to power in August 2021.” According to him, “Pakistan in last two years has lost lives of 2,867 innocent civilians, for which TTP (the banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan) that is operating from Afghanistan, is responsible.”
In addition to its ongoing clash with the Taliban (which also resulted in a widespread expulsion of Afghans from Pakistan), Pakistan is dealing with cross-border strikes initiated by Iran on Pakistani soil against the anti-Iranian insurgent group Jaish al-Adl. Pakistan responded to Iranian missile strikes on its soil with airstrikes against “alleged militant hideouts in Iran.” The threat of a flareup between Iran and Pakistan appears to have subsided for now, but as Asfandyar Mir noted days after the crisis initially erupted in mid-January,
“Despite a current cease-fire along the [India-Pakistan] border, tensions with India persist. On Pakistan’s western border, relations with the Taliban regime have nosedived due to the Taliban’s support for the anti-Pakistan insurgency of the TTP. Thus, by escalating against Iran in this backdrop, Pakistani strategists faced the risk of triggering a long-term, three-front dilemma involving Afghanistan, India and Iran.” [emphasis added]
As Pakistanis head to the polls in a week, there is a litany of challenges the incoming government will have to address. Against this backdrop, what do elections in Pakistan mean for the India-Pakistan relationship?
The Return of Nawaz Sharif?
Nawaz Sharif, touted as the front-runner in Pakistan’s general elections, has publicly called for improved ties with India and highlighted the fact that it was during his government’s previous tenures that two Indian Prime Ministers visited Pakistan (PM Vajpayee in 1999 and PM Modi in 2015).
This is noteworthy given the ongoing stasis in India-Pakistan ties. The past decade has been marred by a series of crises and clashes, with peace-building initiatives far and few in between. In 2014, then-PM Nawaz Sharif attended Indian PM Modi’s inauguration, and in 2015, in a move that surprised many, PM Modi met PM Sharif in Lahore.
These two moves, occurring at the leader level and early in PM Modi’s first term, were the limited bridging initiatives between the two countries in the last 10 years. Since then, there have been a number of crises, mostly prompted by terrorist attacks with links to the Pakistani state, that have plunged bilateral ties to greater depths.
These crises include a terrorist attack on an Indian Air Force base in early 2016, terrorist attacks in September 2016 followed by cross-border strikes by India, a devastating suicide bombing in one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in decades in Kashmir in February 2019 followed by air strikes by India and retaliatory strikes by Pakistan (the first aerial clash between the two states in decades).
In August 2019 the Indian government revoked Kashmir’s special status which led to a diplomatic crisis between the two states given the region’s contested status. India and Pakistan downgraded diplomatic relations with each other in 2019, after India made changes to Kashmir’s status. In March 2022 India accidentally fired a missile into Pakistan, and luckily for the two nations, the incident didn’t spiral into a crisis.
A rare bright spark in India-Pakistan ties was a recommitment by both sides to a ceasefire agreement in 2021. However, the broader trend in the India-Pakistan relationship over the past decade has been one of steady deterioration.
Given this background, Nawaz Sharif’s calls for improved ties between India and Pakistan can be construed as a small step towards fostering trust between the two neighbors. If Sharif does return to power (as the Pakistani Army seeks), the Indian government will be dealing with a known figure who has made attempts to tend to the bilateral relationship.
Furthermore, Sharif’s likely return, made possible by the Pakistani Army, will see a government in Islamabad where the civilian leadership is aligned with the military. Civilian leadership that is in sync with the military on policy issues is a crucial first step for potential dialogue between India and Pakistan. In the past when the army and the civilian government have not seen eye to eye, one actor has often undercut the other – especially when it comes to India.
The importance of a Pakistani government that is in sync with the Army for India-Pak ties has been documented by the late Indian diplomat Satinder Lambah in his 2021 part-memoir In Pursuit of Peace. In a similar vein, Christopher Clary, theorizing on India-Pakistan ties in his recent book The Difficult Politics of Peace, noted that peace is possible between the two states when there is a centralized leadership at the helm in both states. In Pakistan’s ‘hybrid regime’ model, a Prime Minister supported by the Army is the closest one can get to ‘leadership primacy’ (as theorized by Clary) while still maintaining a semblance of electoral politics.
Incentives for peace?
An alignment between the civilian government and the army in Pakistan doesn’t necessitate that dialogue will emerge between the two states. Are there any incentives for the two nations to talk to each other?
Pakistan will have to deal with a range of crises as highlighted above, with economic issues at the forefront, followed by security challenges emanating from the West. Given the plethora of issues that a newly (s)elected Pakistani government has to deal with, a calm India-Pakistan border, a steady improvement of ties with its neighbor, and the potential resumption of cross-border trade would appear to be in Pakistan’s interest.
On the Indian side, there appear to be few incentives that could prompt engagement with their Pakistani counterparts. While Indian officials may publicly posture their antipathy towards Pakistan, it is in India’s interests in the long term to engage with its neighbor.
Indian security forces already have a number of issues to tend to including a serious, unresolved border crisis with the Chinese (now entering its fourth year) and a rapidly deteriorating situation in the military junta-led Myanmar that could have serious implications for the security dynamic in India’s northeast. Reduced commitments for the Indian security establishment in Kashmir coupled with a relatively calm India-Pakistan border will only help.
Implications of Pakistan’s elections for India-Pakistan ties:
Sharif’s recent calls for peace with India have been acknowledged on both sides of the Indo-Pak border. In an article (titled ‘Nawaz Sharif is Pak’s best chance to normalize ties with India’) Indian journalist Shishir Gupta noted that Sharif’s statements calling for normalization of ties with India are important because he “has a credible track record of seeking rapprochement with India.”
In the Pakistani newspaper Dawn, a political observer pointed out that “improving ties with India always remained a point of conflict between Sharif and the establishment in the past. Whenever Nawaz Sharif came to power, he tried to shake hands with India against the wishes of the power that be.”
While Sharif is touted to become Prime Minister in Pakistan, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), led by current Prime Minister Modi is seen as the party most likely to emerge victorious in India’s national elections. A spate of losses at the state level for the Indian National Congress (INC), a key national-level opposition party, coupled with recent rifts within the opposition alliance has only cemented predictions about a third successive win for the BJP.
While there are substantive incentives for both India and Pakistan to engage in dialogue as noted above, any serious observer of this bilateral relationship would hesitate to predict a return to ‘normalcy’ in bilateral ties anytime soon. However, the return of Nawaz Sharif, with the Pakistani Army’s backing, might create the conditions for potential engagement between the two nations on the Pakistani side. It is up to the two states to make use of such opportunities.
In India, the current Prime Minister has shown a penchant for surprise moves with respect to Pakistan in the past. Is it possible that he would undertake steps towards Pakistan as he did early in his first term? If he were to return to power, such measures shouldn’t be discounted.
There are already some diplomatic moves being made that indicate a potential thaw. The Hindu recently reported that,
“India and Pakistan exchanged assignment visas for dozens of diplomats, diplomatic staff and family members to serve at each other’s High Commissions in Islamabad and Delhi on Monday as well. India had sent its Charge D’Affaires (CDA) Geetika Srivastava to Pakistan in August 2023, and has now accepted the appointment of Saad Waraich as Pakistan’s CDA, to replace Aizaz Khan, who is currently officiating as Deputy High Commissioner.”
On its surface, this report may not seem to amount to much. However, seen in totality against appeals for peace made by the leading Prime Ministerial candidate in Pakistan, rumors of an active back-channel, and reports of a strong personal relationship between PM Modi and former PM Sharif, cautious optimism for dialogue between the two countries can be excused.
Looking ahead:
If Nawaz Sharif were to return to power in Pakistan, there would be a civilian leader at the helm who is aligned with the military, creating conditions for dialogue between the two Asian neighbors. Former Prime Minister Sharif has made positive remarks about the future of the bilateral relationship and has previously pursued peace initiatives.
I have outlined some incentives that might get the two states to talk to each other, but there are thorny issues that remain unresolved. Key among these, from a Pakistani perspective, is the 2019 move by the Indian government to revoke Kashmir’s special status. Disputed by the two sides, leading Pakistani political parties have listed this issue in their respective manifestos.
For instance, the 2024 PML-N manifesto states,
“Relations with India would be anchored in mutual respect, a shared vision for regional stability, and economic growth [along] the following lines:
Both nations need to engage in sustained diplomatic dialogue to address and mitigate regional tensions
Primacy will be given to the resolution of disputes, especially that of Jammu and Kashmir…
PMLN strongly holds the position that normalization of ties with India, cannot take place till New Delhi reverses the unilateral measures taken on August 5, 2019.”
The Pakistan People’s Party [PPP] 2024 manifesto notes,
“We believe that while normalizing relations with Bharat is essential for regional peace and stability, talks will only be meaningful in an atmosphere of mutual respect with all dialogue being conducted through diplomatic channels.”
It is imperative also to note that the Pakistani Army’s support for Sharif will not directly translate into a majority for his party. Observers note that a coalition government, comprising the PML-N and PPP, may be in the offing. If this transpires, independent candidates (including PTI members bereft of a common election symbol) will play an outsized role.
Ahmed Mehboob, President of the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency, highlighted the “extraordinarily high percentage of independent candidates in the run.” He further noted that,
“In the past 11 elections, the number of independent candidates for the NA [National Assembly] hovered around 53 percent whereas now 63 percent of independent candidates are competing. The additional 10 percentage points translate into an additional 500 independent candidates, which means that there are 264 (after subtracting the PTI’s claimed candidates) additional independent candidates. These may be covering candidates for the PTI or part of another scheme which may unfold after the election… Unless the returned independent candidates, especially those nominated by the PTI, display a strong character and party loyalty, there is a likelihood that such independent legislators will be vulnerable to huge pressure and temptations. In the 2018 general election, returned independent candidates played a decisive role in the formation of the PTI-led governments at the federal level and in Punjab.”
While several political permutations and combinations could be conceived of, what is undeniable at the moment is that the Army has put its support behind Nawaz Sharif, and the state has cracked down on Imran Khan in an unprecedented manner (remarkable even by Pakistani standards, given that over two-thirds of Pakistan’s “civilian rulers have been arrested, convicted or disqualified since the country gained independence” in 1947).
Furthermore even as various actors navigate a tricky landscape in Pakistan, for India, dialogue with its neighbor is a political decision. The factors that would prompt the Indian leadership to engage with its counterpart remain opaque to a large extent. Crucially, non-state actors, often supported and sustained by state actors in Pakistan, could actively seek to fuel tensions between the two states should there be any positive movement in bilateral ties. Terrorist acts designed to feed animosity are an ever-present threat and can send bilateral ties in a downward spiral.
Notwithstanding these challenges, there are ways through which India and Pakistan can engage with each other. Serious efforts at dialogue in the past two decades have often occurred in the aftermath of serious crises. For instance, the 2003 ceasefire agreement that substantially reduced tensions at the border arose after India and Pakistan almost went to war in 2001-02; the 2021 recommitment to the ceasefire agreement came about after the downgrading of diplomatic ties and a serious clash between the two nations in 2019.
Engaging in dialogue is always a choice for leadership in India and Pakistan, and there are creative diplomatic processes. A back-channel between the two has been effective in the past and could lead to breakthroughs even now. Re-establishing high-level diplomatic ties would ensure that the two sides are talking to each other. Perhaps the most critical factor to ensure that India and Pakistan engage with each other is political will on both sides.
Links:
On China’s manufacturing strength: This Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) piece documents the manufacturing juggernaut that is China. See China’s share in the global manufacturing pie below:
Source: Richard Baldwin, CEPR On tariffs & the solar industry: This Canary Media article is a reminder that “the threat of destabilizing tariffs remains very real for the U.S. solar industry.”
On the significance of a recent temple ceremony in India: Rohan Venkat, author of the excellent India Inside Out newsletter, recently put out a piece about the implications of a recent temple ceremony that was presided over by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Book recommendation: I recently finished reading Amitav Ghosh’ Smoke & Ashes. Ghosh traces the transformative impact of the opium trade engineered by the colonial British trade across India & China. The long-standing repercussions of the British Raj’s practices are evident even today and reflected in the disparities between East & West India. In addition to gaining insight into how networks of repression and extraction perpetuate across centuries, I was reminded of the importance of questioning established Western narratives of how and why colonialism played out the way it did.
I also discovered some stunning 19th century Indian art thanks to this book! See this thread.
